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Kristian Cantens  
How Should we Conceptualize Moral Disagreements about Animals? 
I intend this paper as a sort of philosophical reflection on my experiences as an animal 
activist. In my three years of doing outreach on college campuses, I came to an increasing 
appreciation for what Murdoch referred to as “the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and 
the opacity of persons” (Murdoch 1998d, 293). This appreciation came in turn at the cost of an 
increasing disappointment with many of the philosophers I admired at the time – namely, Peter 
Singer and Tom Regan. What I came to understand is that many of these contemporary moral 
theories were in fact inadequate at grappling with the multi-faceted and endlessly varied 
phenomenon of moral disagreement as I encountered it in my experiences as an animal activist. 
In what follows, I hope to articulate what I found disappointing about philosophers like Regan 
and Singer. In pursuing this critique, however, I will instead focus on the more contemporary 
work of Paola Cavalieri: a philosopher very much in the same tradition as Regan and Singer. 
Afterwards, I will explore the merits of an alternative picture of moral disagreement, one 
I found in Virginia Woolf’s essay, “The Death of the Moth.” Throughout, I will be relying on the 
insights of Iris Murdoch and Cora Diamond.  
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Chapter 1: Cavalieri and the Behaviorist Picture of Moral Disagreement 
In the search for a theory of morality that is precise, neutral, and law-like, certain 
tendencies have emerged which have effectively narrowed what could be called the “field of 
study” (Murdoch 1998c, 76). These tendencies, common in contemporary moral philosophy, 
grow out of a desire to emulate the sciences in their neutrality and in their ability to generate 
laws which can be used to masterfully describe the patterns that underlie the (messy) world 
around us. A certain rationale seems to underlie this aspiration for philosophy: when considered 
in relation to the successes of the sciences (as evidenced in their endless ability to churn out 
technological advances which ever benefit our lives), philosophy looks more like a quaint 
pastime at best – a corrupt and indulgent enterprise at worst. If moral philosophers are ever to 
leak into the public discourse in any meaningful way, a more empirical, universal, and 
systematic approach must be pursued. 
In their attempts to develop such a theory, these philosophers have begun to follow a 
certain procedure – what I will henceforth refer to as ‘the common approach’ (or, CA). We can 
think of the CA as being structured according to roughly two patterns. First, in determining and 
demarcating what is to become the field of study, and in surveying the facts in search of the 
fundamental patterns which can be clearly agreed upon as underpinning and animating the 
aggregate phenomena that we call ‘morality’, the CA excludes wholesale any phenomenon that 
is ‘metaphysical’ or ‘transcendent’ in nature. What is to be considered is only that which is 
empirically and publically open to view. By omitting from the selection all phenomena which 
don’t meet a certain degree of objectivity, reliability, and universality, a more ‘scientific’ 
approach can be pursued.  
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Second, in developing a philosophical technique (a theory) with which to make sense of 
the selected phenomena, the CA gives preference to the one which best provides us with a 
comprehensive, totalizing, codifiable, and universalizable explanation of morality. The technique 
should be such that we could rely on it to determine with absolute certainty both what is at issue 
and how we ought to act, effortlessly and no matter the situation – that is, as long as we’re in full 
view of the empirical facts. The technique would do this by formulating a universal moral 
principle that lays out the logic of morality in its entirety. The moral ‘laws’ which result from 
this approach can be thought of as analogous to the laws we formulate in the sciences – laws of 
gravity, relativity, thermodynamics, etc.  
After the phenomena are selected for study, and a technique developed to describe it, we 
may begin to see a tendency of mutual reinforcement between the two: i.e., the phenomena lend 
support to that particular technique, which in turn lends support to the selected phenomena. It is 
thus customary for the CA to confine moral thought within a predetermined mold, or conceptual 
structure – which in turn stifles philosophical exploration of the phenomenon of morality, and 
sets rigid boundaries for what can be said to constitute moral discourse and moral discovery. 
Moreover, despite its allure of simplicity, neutrality, and precision, I want to argue that 
this picture of morality embodies certain tendencies which leave a range of important moral 
phenomena unexplained and unaccounted for – i.e., what could be called a person’s ‘inner life’ 
and their ‘moral vision’. As Murdoch notes, “it has readily been assumed that in assembling the 
data [i.e. phenomena]… for the moral philosopher to work on, we can safely leave aside not only 
the inner monologue and its like, but also overt manifestations of personal attitudes, speculations, 
or visions of life such as might find expression in talk not immediately directed to the solution of 
specific moral problems. In short, the material which the philosopher is to work on is simply… 
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acts and choices, and… arguments… which appeal to [empirical] facts” (Murdoch 1998c, 79-
80).  In making my case I will limit myself to a specific area of moral life (a particularly 
challenging and rich area in my opinion): that of moral disagreement. In other words, I want to 
argue that there’s a dimension to disagreement that goes unexplained and unaccounted for by the 
CA – specifically in regards both to how we disagree and what we disagree about.  
In respect to how we disagree, the CA pursues a pattern of thought which we could refer 
to as behavioristic, where all that matters are discrete acts and choices. In respect to what we 
disagree about, the CA adheres to a scientistic picture of one’s moral landscape, where the moral 
concepts which we have access to in describing and evaluating our reality are strictly those that 
cohere with a scientific understanding of reality.  
In what follows, I will present Cavalieri’s argument for animal rights and show how it 
exhibits the behaviorist and scientistic tendencies of the CA. To characterize Cavalieri’s position, 
I will draw on her essay The Death of the Animal: A Dialogue on Perfectionism. In this essay 
Cavalieri presents both a negative thesis and a positive one.  
Cavalieri’s negative thesis comes in two parts. The first is a critique of a certain tendency 
in our thinking – a tendency which she finds in philosophy, as well as in the sort of justifications 
people commonly seem to make in their domination of animals: she refers to this tendency as 
“perfectionism.” In her words, perfectionists are those who “hold that there is a hierarchy in 
moral status. They maintain that conscious beings, and their interests, deserve different 
consideration according to their level of possession of certain characteristics… [In other words] 
perfectionism… is a kind of gradualism – it accepts degrees in moral status. Some individuals 
matter more than other individuals, and can be treated differently” (Cavalieri 2009, 3). In other 
words, perfectionists seem to hold (1) that a being ought to be ranked as more or less valuable 
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according to how much or how little of a certain characteristic they possess. And (2) that the 
characteristics which determine moral status are characteristics commonly associated with 
humans.  
 She goes on to argue in the second part of her negative thesis that the perfectionist 
tendency comes as a result of untenable and inherently hierarchical metaphysical world-views 
that place humans on top. Cavalieri defines metaphysics in this context as being “myths.” Myths, 
that is, “in the sense of a more or less sacred story that can convey a lot of meaning but rests 
outside the disjunction of true or false” (Cavalieri 2009, 7). These myths moreover are often 
illicitly “translated into normatively hierarchical frameworks,” which inevitably happens because 
they “embody structures that offer answers to fundamental” moral questions (5). An example of 
this would be praising a person’s character in relation to the abstract ideal of goodness, and 
claiming that this goodness is a discernable quality in the world that exists independent of us.  
What Cavalieri seems to categorize as metaphysical are all those explanations of reality 
that are not scientific in nature. If they are not scientific, they are not suitable for answering 
moral questions, since they wouldn’t give us objective and universal truths (at least not the sort 
of empirically verifiable truths that science provides us). Ultimately, Cavalieri seems to believe 
that in the same way that science was able to truly flourish only after it had freed itself from its 
religious and metaphysical allegiances, so should ethics proceed if it is to achieve the sort of 
success and status of the hard sciences (95). 
In what follows I want to show how Cavalieri’s negative theses narrow the range of 
phenomena that can be included as part of the field of study. More specifically, I want to say that 
(1) in taking a stance against a perfectionist approach, Cavalieri effectively aligns herself with a 
behaviorist conception of moral disagreement, and (2) in taking a stance against a metaphysical 
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approach, she pursues a scientistic approach in construing moral concepts (i.e. she models her 
moral concepts after scientific concepts).  
I 
 In this section I want to show how Cavalieri, in her argument against perfectionism, 
implicitly adopts a behaviorist stance in respect to the inner life and its place in morality. 
Perfectionism, as we saw, requires (1) the belief that our reality is at least partially transcendent 
in nature – that is, it cannot be wholly understood according to the natural sciences; and (2) that 
this moral reality (which transcends scientific explanation) is hierarchically structured – that is, 
there exist degrees in moral status as a result of some metaphysical characteristic. The 
implication is that these two components almost always go hand-in-hand, and that they almost 
always result in the assignation of higher moral status to humans over non-human animals 
(Cavalieri 2009, 14). Cavalieri then associates perfectionism with virtue ethics, and more 
specifically, with theories that see “morality as a set of orientations for developing forms of 
excellence and for giving meaning to one’s life” (13). The reason Cavalieri associates virtue 
ethics with perfectionism and metaphysical worldviews is because the virtues themselves are 
considered metaphysical entities. Even the guiding question of ‘what it means to be a good 
human being’ (which can be considered the starting point for virtue ethics) is itself dependent on 
a belief in metaphysics. ‘A good human being’ is not a scientific/biological category, and yet for 
a virtue ethicist it’s a concept which nevertheless refers to something real in the world. The same 
goes for ‘courage’, ‘generosity’, ‘compassion’, etc.  
Next, Cavalieri argues that a perfectionist/metaphysical approach is an instance of 
“morality in the broad sense – an all-inclusive theory of conduct, which includes precepts about 
the good life, the character traits to be fostered, the values to be pursued.” Morality in the broad 
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sense is to be distinguished from what she calls “morality in the narrow sense – a system of 
constraints on conduct, usually expressed in terms of negative duties, whose task is to protect the 
interests of others – e.g., do not harm, do not confine, do not kill” (9). Moreover, unlike broad 
morality, narrow morality doesn’t require substantiation by metaphysical entities. Part of the 
reason Cavalieri wants to make a distinction between broad and narrow morality is to say that 
one need not totally abandon their belief in a transcendent and normative reality. A belief in a 
transcendent reality is okay as long one acknowledges that this reality is “arbitrary” (27) – that 
is: not grounded in facts as “morality in the narrow sense” is (9) – and thus should never take 
precedence over morality in the narrow sense.  
In making this distinction, Cavalieri essentially claims that morality can be done (and 
done better) without making reference to or relying on the idiosyncrasies of the inner life (non-
empirical phenomena such as one’s character and the values to be pursued). Indeed, if what 
we’re after is a set of moral principles that are universalizable – that are true for everyone – we 
cannot formulate them by appealing to any subjective data. What this distinction ends up 
creating is “a separation between what a person is like, where that is tied to his style of thought, 
and his capacities as a moral agent” (Diamond 1998, 271).  
Once the distinction is made, Cavalieri argues that broad morality should never be relied 
on “when what is at issue is the treatment of individuals” (Cavalieri 2009, 27). She argues that it 
would be wrong for morality in the broad sense to encroach upon what she calls “the territory of 
social morality” (34) because, given the importance of the task at hand, “it is unacceptable to 
draw universal values from arbitrary interpretations of reality” (emphasis mine; 27). In short, 
“when what is at stake is basic moral treatment, there is no room for the arbitrariness of general 
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belief systems” (38). On the contrary, the only acceptable belief systems we’re to draw on in 
formulating universal moral principles for conduct must be empirically verifiable.  
 Largely, what seems to be driving Cavalieri in her arguments against perfectionism, 
virtue ethics, and morality in the broad sense is the suspicion (and consequent fear) that to 
include into the field of study phenomena associated in any way with the “cloudy and shifting 
domain” of the inner life is to sacrifice objectivity in ethics, is to make ethics ‘arbitrary’ 
(Murdoch 1998d, 74). An understanding of reality that (to a degree) relies on the private, 
introspective phenomena of one’s mental life must, by extension, be an understanding which (to 
a degree) is particular to each individual. If one is to overcome this threat of subjectivity, one 
must reject the idea that the inner life could play a role in how we come to understand our moral 
reality. More specifically, one must reject as being of no relevance phenomena such as a 
person’s “mode of speech or silence, their choice of words, their assessment of others, their 
conception of their own lives, what they think attractive or praiseworthy, what they think funny: 
in short the configurations of their thought which show continually in their reactions and 
conversations… things which may be overly and comprehensibly displayed or inwardly 
elaborated and guessed at” (Murdoch 1998c, 81). Indeed, since these sorts of phenomena vary 
greatly between person to person, allowing them into what we take to be the field of study would 
make it impossible to generate a universalizable “system of constraints on conduct” (Cavalieri 
2009, 9). It would, in other words, make it impossible to capture the underlying logic of ethics 
through a single argument (since there would be no single logic, but rather “fundamentally 
different moral pictures which different individuals use or which the same individual may use at 
different times.” Philosophy, then, would have to “remain at the level of the differences, taking 
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the moral forms of life as given, and not try to get behind them to a single form” (Murdoch 
1998c, 97).  
Ultimately, Cavalieri thinks that to allow our understanding of our moral reality to be in 
any way predicated on the private phenomena of our inner life is to open the flood gates to a 
transcendent, normative, and hierarchical moral universe that necessarily “rests outside of the 
disjunction of true and false” (Cavalieri 2009, 7). Therefore, if our goal is to generate universal 
reasons for actions, our moral reality must not be determined by or predicated in any way by 
phenomena which aren’t empirical or objective. As Murdoch notes: “The notion of privileged 
access to inner events has been held morally suspect because, among other things, it would 
separate people from ‘the ordinary world of rational argument’” (Murdoch 1998b, 326).  
At this point, it seems fair to say that the worldview which Cavalieri subscribes to is one 
where “we all live in the same empirical and rationally comprehensible world and that morality 
is the adoption of universal and openly defensible rules of conduct” (Murdoch 1998c, 88). What 
I would like to do next is to explore in more detail the implications of this worldview for how we 
conceptualize and/or picture the moral life of the individual.  
In order to characterize what a person is like, morally, Cavalieri would only look to the 
choices they make. Since reality, for her, consists only in what is publically and empirically 
observable, the only human activity which could bring “about a recognizable change in the 
world” is action (Murdoch 1998b, 302). Put differently, if we construe reality as only having an 
empirical dimension, then the only human activity which could show up on our radar (and thus 
the only activity which we could meaningfully talk about) is a person’s behavior.  
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Despite the emphasis on behavior, a person’s inner life is not wholly excluded in this 
picture; it is given a role, however diminished: in Diamond’s words, “one’s thinking… can have 
moral interest only in so far as they dispose the user of the language to choose one sort of action 
rather than another” (Diamond 1988, 271). Additionally, if choice is to be regarded as moral, it 
must be “supportable by reasons which are universalizable.” (The goal of Cavalieri’s theory, as 
we’ve seen, is to generate a system of constraints on conduct which is universally binding for all 
rational agents). The thoughts that count, then, in addition to providing us with the language to 
choose, must also conform to a picture of universal reasoning – after all, thoughts must conform 
to the structure of universal reasoning if they are to seek universalizable reasons for action 
(Murdoch 1998c, 85).  
In the resulting picture, the individual comes in only as a rational agent whom we can 
characterize, morally, by the choices they make. If we are to apply scrutiny to the choices of a 
rational agent, we may look to the reasons which they gave for their choices. These reasons can 
be thought of as arguments backed up by facts. These arguments, in turn, must rely on language 
which conforms to the picture of universal reasoning. Thus, “the material which the philosopher 
is to work on is simply (under the heading of behavior) acts and choices, and (under the heading 
of language) choice-guiding words together with the arguments which display the descriptive 
meaning of these words” (Murdoch 1998c, 79).  
There are several limitations to this picture which I’d quickly like to point out. First, the 
inner life, defined as “personal attitudes and visions which do not obviously take the form of 
choice-guiding arguments” is completely excluded from the field of study (Murdoch 1998c, 80). 
This means that a person’s private mental life, their character, their particular style of thinking – 
all these things aren’t allowed to factor into what a person is like, nor are they allowed to factor 
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into what a person’s moral universe is like. To use an example: there would be no reason to think 
(according to Cavalieri’s view) that the fact that a certain person (X) is vegan is a characteristic 
which would entail a difference in what X is like, or what X’s moral universe is like; it wouldn’t 
be a characteristic that X would display in any way other than in their actions. In turn, if we 
wanted to praise X for their commitment to animals, we couldn’t point to things like the manner 
in which they speak of animals (e.g. with kindness, curiosity, or fascination), the distress they 
experience in light of an animal’s misfortune (e.g. when they drive past a dead deer on the road), 
or the courage and sincerity they display (e.g. in voicing their convictions at the risk of being 
ridiculed). If we wanted to praise X, we would have only their actions to judge – i.e., the fact that 
they choose not to eat meat. Here one might feel compelled to say that the choice itself, of 
whether to eat meat or not, isn’t what really matters; it does not, in other words, encompass the 
totality of what it usually means to be vegan. In fact, perhaps the most defining feature of what it 
means to be vegan is that the act of eating meat might not present itself as a choice at all: given 
what an ‘animal’ is to them, ‘eating animals’ isn’t seen as a choice, or even a wrong choice, but 
rather as something you don’t do. It would be conceptually confusing, in other words – perhaps 
in the same way that the idea of eating one’s pet is conceptually confusing. As Diamond notes, 
“it is not 'morally wrong' to eat our pets; people who ate their pets would not have pets in the 
same sense of that term. (If we call an animal that we are fattening for the table a pet, we are 
making a crude joke of a familiar sort.) A pet is not something to eat, it is given a name, is let 
into our houses and may be spoken to in ways in which we do not normally speak to cows or 
squirrels. That is to say, it is given some part of the character of a person” (Diamond 1998, 323-
324).  
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To make a slightly different point with a slightly different example, suppose you have 
someone who associates meat eating with certain cherished childhood memories – meat eating 
could be ingrained in a way of life which is integral to their identity. Similarly, in this case and 
for this person, eating meat might not present itself as a choice. Indeed, this person could simply 
say, “I would never stop eating meat, and can never imagine myself doing so. If the day ever 
came where I stopped, I would not be the same person. I would not recognize that person as 
myself.” We couldn’t look at this person and talk about his decision to eat meat as if that were 
the heart of the issue. We couldn’t say that deep down the decision was really a perfectionist 
belief in human superiority over animals. Moreover, if the decision to eat meat is defended on 
the grounds that it coheres with one’s identity, then we also wouldn’t be able to say that such a 
reason aspires to universality, and thus, we wouldn’t even be able to classify that as a reason at 
all.  
Another limitation of this view is, to use Diamond’s words, that it understands “moral 
differences between people” as arising only when “moral concepts [are applied] in different 
ways to the same world.” What it fails to see is that “the conceptual activities of the mind and the 
spirit in which we see the world make us who we are, morally speaking; two people may not, in 
the relevant sense, inhabit the same world” (Diamond 2010, 73). The inability to see this comes 
as a result of subscribing to what Murdoch calls “the genetic theory of meaning,” which holds 
that the moral concepts we make use of derive their meaning solely from outward patterns of 
behavior (Murdoch 1998b, 303-311). According to this theory, we learn the meaning of concepts 
only by witnessing how that concept is used by others: “How do I learn the concept of decision? 
By watching someone who says ‘I have decided’ and who then acts” (309). Even after one 
acquires the concept of decision, the genetic theory does not think that one could then “move on 
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from a behavioristic concept to a mental one… A decision does not turn out to be… an 
introspectible movement. The concept has no further inner structure; it is its outer structure.” 
Concepts in this picture could then be thought of as “lines drawn round separable factual areas” – 
and if they’re moral concepts we simply add a recommendation (Murdoch 1998c, 95). Since a 
concept could only ever be defined according to purely empirical criteria, disagreements over the 
use of a moral concept could only be conceived as disagreements over what facts we’re to define 
our concepts in terms of – i.e., over our factual criteria. 
What the genetic theory of meaning fails to see is that our concepts often do taken on 
additional meaning on the basis of our lived and private experiences. Concepts can be deepened, 
and refined over time and their meanings can change through purely mental processes like 
contemplation or attention. What it fails to see is that the structure of a concept is often 
contingent on and/or contextual to an individual’s unique history. To use Murdoch’s example: 
our notion of love is often much different at 20 than it is at 50. If we see concepts having an 
inner/historical structure in this way, moral disagreements start to appear less like a matter of 
arguing over factual criteria and more “like a total difference of gestalt. We differ not only 
because we select different objects out of the same world but because we see different worlds” 
(Murdoch 1998c, 82). 
II 
Before we move on to Cavalieri’s argument for animal rights, I want to more closely 
attend to the picture of concepts that she subscribes to (and which I introduced in the last section 
under the heading of ‘the genetic theory of meaning’). Given that her arguments are, in the end, 
simply arguments for why certain criteria (and not others) should determine the meaning of the 
moral concepts we’re to act in accordance with, we need to know a bit more about the nature of 
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the concepts she subscribes to before we fully can understand the nature of her arguments. Thus, 
what I want to argue in this section is that Cavalieri makes use of moral concepts and moral 
vocabulary in a way that closely models the way we use language and apply concepts in the 
sciences – an approach which, in turn, leaves us “blind to uses of words for which that picture 
leaves no room” (Diamond 1988, 262).  
In the sciences, concepts are deliberately formulated in a simple and straightforward way. 
This is because, in Murdoch’s words, “Scientific language tries to be impersonal and exact and 
yet accessible for purposes of teamwork” (Murdoch 1998b, 326). To demonstrate proficiency in 
using a scientific concept, one need only rely on their senses and their reason (because only those 
faculties can provide us with data that is objective and empirical and thus universalizable). A 
person is thus proficient in their use of a scientific concept if they can successfully “group the 
right things under it” (Diamond 1988, 266). In this picture, concepts are used for the purposes of 
classification: they place “a movable and extensible ring laid down to cover a certain area of 
fact” in order to make distinctions between that grouping of empirical facts, and other groupings 
(Murdoch 1998c, 82).  
To further illustrate the scientific picture of concepts and to begin to inquire into the 
relevance that Cavalieri’s technique might have for how we do moral philosophy, we can turn to 
an example by Cora Diamond:  
It seems to be the view of many analytic philosophers that the concept of a human being 
is the concept of a member of a particular biological species, Homo sapiens. The 
literature on animal rights furnishes a particularly clear example; it is argued repeatedly 
there that being human is not a morally relevant characteristic of a thing, because 
membership in a particular species is not – as if it were patent that the notion of human 
being, as used in moral discussion… had to be a biological notion. (Diamond 1988, 263) 
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For Diamond, in order to truly understand what it means to be a human being one must know 
more than just the biological category which corresponds to that concept. Indeed, one must also 
know how to use that concept in a variety of diverse moral contexts – one must be able to 
“participate in life-with-the-concept” (Diamond 1988, 264-266). This form of understanding, for 
Diamond, entails much more than just to “construe… [the concept of human being] as 
combining description of a thing as a member of that species with some evaluation or 
prescription concerning the thing: ‘protect its life’ and so on” (263). Indeed, what it means to 
know a concept should also entail a knowledge of what it is like to live, think, and understand 
things with that concept.  
Put differently, the sort of activity which goes into giving concepts meaning, on 
Diamond’s account, is not simply behavior. We do not come to understand a concept solely 
through a process of discerning patterns in the behaviors of others and distilling from that a 
series of rules (rules which allow us to determine how to group the right things under the 
concept) and following those rules as best we can. Our thought – defined broadly as all cognitive 
actives of the mind – also has a role in giving concepts meaning. More specifically, we do not 
come to understand the moral concepts of others simply by trying to determine what evaluative 
principle, what criterion for ‘right’ action, is implied or expressed by the moral choices they 
make. To use Murdoch’s words, “Here communication of a new moral concept cannot 
necessarily be achieved by specification of factual criteria open to any observer… but may 
involve the communication of a completely new, possibly far-reaching and coherent vision… 
differences are in this sense ‘conceptual’ and not exclusively behavioristic” (Murdoch 1998c, 
82).  
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For Cavalieri, however, to assign the concept of human being any (moral) connotations 
other than the biological one is (to use her terms) an illicit appeal to metaphysics, as well as an 
instance of perfectionism. Moreover, Cavalieri associates the failure to adhere to the scientific 
picture of moral concepts with philosophy’s lack of success as a discipline. In her words, the 
“insertion of foreign elements into moral philosophy has clear parallels in science… [I.e.:] The 
introduction of a priori philosophical or religious concepts to explain the natural world… 
checked [its] development… [and] science could proceed only by freeing itself from such 
external ties. The same holds for ethics” (Cavalieri 2009, 94-95). In a particularly illuminating 
section, Cavalieri even associates the failure to adhere to the scientific picture of moral concepts 
with the rise of Nazism: 
Don’t we condemn the Nazi policy of discriminating against – indeed, exploiting and 
killing – individuals on the basis of the biological group they belonged to? And don’t we 
do this because we hold that scientific classifications in themselves have no bearing in 
ethics, and that biological characteristics such as gender or race membership have no 
moral relevance? And yet, when we say that humans should be morally protected qua 
humans, aren’t we giving moral weight to a biological characteristic – that is, species 
membership? (Cavalieri 2009, 36).  
 
The Nazis, of course, were justifying their ‘discrimination’1 of non-Aryans not solely (or, in my 
opinion, hardly at all) on the basis of biological characteristics, but also on the basis of what 
Cavalieri would call a perfectionist and metaphysical worldview: Aryans were deemed the 
‘chosen race’ and whatnot, while Jews were considered ‘vermin’ to be ‘exterminated’ in order to 
‘purify’ the ‘nation’. This perfectionist and metaphysical worldview, Cavalieri thinks, is one 
which was superimposed over biological criteria, blanketing the scientific universe with a simple 
evaluatory framework. Thus in criticizing the Nazis, Cavalieri doesn’t take issue with the 
                                                          
1 I don’t really think that’s the right word for it.  
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particular moral concepts they employed or with the particular ways in which these concepts 
were used (concepts like “Aryan’, ‘chosen race’, ‘Jew’, ‘vermin’, ‘extermination’, and 
‘purification’); rather, (and I think this is revealing) what she takes issue with is the assigning of 
normative value to what are, in the end, simply biological characteristics. One might say here 
that Cavalieri misunderstands the Nazis. What a Jew is for them is not at all a biological notion. 
To see that, one need only look at the way Jews were portrayed, thought of, talked about, and 
treated in Germany at the time, the way they existed in the collective imagination of a people. To 
say that it was only a matter of assigning normative value to certain biological characteristics is 
to totally miss the point. What a Jew is could never just be a scientific concept (to anyone but a 
Martian, perhaps).  
For Cavalieri, if concepts are to function according to the scientific picture, they cannot 
contain within their meaning anything that transcends a straightforward scientific category. To 
think otherwise is to believe that there exists a dimension to our world that is not entirely 
reducible to empirical facts, that is not objective, or public, or open to view by any onlooker; it is 
to picture moral concepts as deriving their meaning from the configuration of thought of a 
certain individual. To give so much significance to this private, introspective dimension, and to 
think that the way we think in turn affects how we see the world and what we find valuable in it 
– all this is deeply unsettling for a lot of philosophers. As Murdoch notes, “The notion of 
privileged access to inner events has been held morally suspect because, among other things, it 
would separate people from ‘the ordinary world of rational argument’…This conclusion is feared 
and avoided by many moralists because it seems inimical to the operation of reason and because 
reason is construed on a scientific model (Murdoch 1998b, 326). In other words, an account of 
moral concepts which moves away from the scientistic model is feared because it would make it 
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more difficult for philosophers to settle moral disputes with the sort of finitude, objectivity, and 
universality that is sought after in the sciences. Indeed, this fear is what ultimately has driven the 
pursuit of “a rationalistic desire for unity” as well as the search for a “single philosophical 
definition of morality” that we see in much of contemporary philosophy (Murdoch 1998c, 97). 
With this in mind we can also better understand why so many philosophers limit the concepts 
they use to ‘right’ and ‘good’: doing so allows them to attempt to capture the logic of morality 
within a single concept.  
In this picture, the job of the moral philosopher is to find factual criteria for the moral 
concepts that they’ve established as sovereign, and to defend these criteria with rational 
arguments. So, if they were to define a concept like right, they would have to group the correct 
things under it alongside the correct moral recommendation. For Cavalieri, right is a concept we 
can appeal to in order to recommend certain actions, and discourage others (remember: actions 
are all we have to work with). In turn, we can determine what actions are right by searching for 
factual criteria. The question becomes: In virtue of what facts are we to say that an action is 
right? Here we have to be careful, they might say, lest we commit the naturalistic fallacy. We do 
not, in other words, want to say that we can derive moral content from a fact itself: facts and 
concepts, and indeed all descriptive language, are construed after the scientific model, and thus 
always must remain value free. However, we can settle on a right making criterion if we can find 
one which is both consistent with many of the moral judgments we commonly make, and which 
would include into the sphere of moral consideration all those beings whom we are concerned 
with.2 The criterion that Cavalieri settles on is ‘interests’: “through their having positive and 
                                                          
2 I think it would be a significant question to ask if ‘settle’, ‘consistency’, and ‘inclusion’ are 
functioning like moral concepts here.  
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negative attitudes about what happens to them, subjects are the only immediate and 
uncontroversial sources of value… [In other words] the criterion for access to the sphere of 
rights holders is simply the fact of being an agent that is an intentional being that has goals and 
wants to achieve them” (Cavalieri 2009, 38-39). 
For Cavalieri, a preliminary list of the necessary moral concepts could look something 
like this:  
 ‘Right’ (Functions as the sovereign concept – all other concepts orbit around it) 
o Description: actions by moral agents which promote the interests of moral patients. 
o Prescription: moral agents ought to engage in right action towards moral patients; 
moral agents ought to act in a way in which the interests of moral patients are given 
consideration.  
 ‘Moral patient’ 
o Description: beings to whom we extend moral consideration; beings with the capacity 
to have interests. 
o Prescription: we ought to extend moral consideration to moral patients; we ought to 
take their interests into account. 
 ‘Moral Agent’ 
o Description: rational beings.  
o Prescription: rational beings ought to act rationally.  
 ‘Rationality’ 
o Description: the capacity for universal reasoning; the capacity to use logic.  
o Prescription: we ought to be ‘rational’.  
 ‘Interests’ 
o Description: beings with the capacity to feel pain and pleasure can be said to have an 
interests in the sense that they are interested in avoiding pain and seeking pleasure.  
o Prescription: we ought to promote interests. 
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Having established how Cavalieri wants her moral concepts to function and what concepts 
she intends to use, we can now begin to inquire as to the limitations that such a worldview3 may 
have for our understanding of moral disagreement. I think we can see the limitations most clearly 
if we focus on her concept of interests. For Cavalieri, the capacity to have interests is the only 
thing which can factor into determining how we ought to ethically engage with others. Thus, 
“our starting point in thinking about the relationship” both among human beings and between 
human beings and other animals is: “a moral agent as an item on one side, and on the other a 
being capable of suffering” (Diamond 1991, 325). However, Diamond objects to this approach: 
We cannot say, “This thing (whatever concepts it may fall under) is at any rate capable of 
suffering, so we ought not to make it suffer.” That 'this' is a being which I ought not to 
make suffer, or whose suffering I should try to prevent, constitutes a special relationship 
to it, or rather, any of a number of such relationships – for example, what its suffering is 
in relation to me might depend upon its being my mother. That I ought to attend to a 
being's sufferings and enjoyments is not the fundamental moral relation to it, determining 
how I ought to act towards it – no more fundamental than that this man, being my 
brother, is a being about whom I should not entertain sexual fantasies. (325) 
 
It’s important to note that Diamond here doesn’t reject the notion that suffering matters morally 
in our relations with others, what she rejects is the idea that suffering must always be “the 
fundamental moral relation” as opposed to simply one “of a number of such relationships.” What 
she wants to say is that, in determining the moral nature of a relationship, much more should be 
considered than whether or not the ‘thing’ in question is capable of suffering. More specifically, 
by settling on suffering as the most fundamental moral characteristic – and indeed, as the only 
                                                          
3 Any understanding of the world is predicated on the concepts one makes use of. The 
configuration of our world reflects the configuration of our concepts. Thus, to understand 
Cavalieri’s world one must first understand her concepts. Once one understands her concepts, we 
can talk about her ‘worldview’. ‘Worldview’ here is synonymous to ‘the conceptual scheme that 
determines how one views the world’. 
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moral characteristic with significance – we blind ourselves to the possibility that in some cases 
(or even in most cases) other concepts may be significant (perhaps even more significant).  
To use an example, if we look at the practice of eating meat, we will quickly see that 
having interests is not really that important: it is not the concept which seems most apt for the 
task of understanding, say, why many people eat farmed animals and not pets, why vegans don’t 
eat any animals at all, and why people in general don’t eat other people. To use Diamond’s 
example: 
Treating pets in these ways [i.e. not eating them] is not at all a matter of recognizing 
some interest which pets have in being so treated. There is not a class of beings, pets, 
whose nature, whose capacities, are such that we owe it to them to treat them in these 
ways. Similarly, it is not out of respect for the interests of beings of the class to which we 
belong that we give names to each other, or that we treat human sexuality or birth or 
death as we do, marking them -in their various ways – as significant or serious. And 
again, it is not respect for our interests which is involved in our not eating each other. 
(324)  
 
Diamond ultimately wants to say that, in light of these facts, one of the most straightforward 
ways of proceeding might just be to look at the concept of ‘animal’ and ‘human’ – to look at 
them, not as biological classifications, but as deep and expansive moral concepts which play a 
role in configuring the ways we think and the ways we make sense of the world. We should look 
at these concepts and ask ourselves: given what a human is, and given what an animal is, what 
are the proper relations between the two? That, at least, would be a good way of beginning.  
III 
 I intend this section to be relatively short. My only objective will be to inquire as to how 
Cavalieri decides on a right-making criterion, and as to why she settles on the biological capacity 
to have interests as the only suitable grounds for an ethic. In order to do this I first want to bring 
to the fore two concepts which could be said to lie in the background, and which form the frame 
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of Cavalieri’s argument. Those concepts are: ‘moral agent’, ‘rationality’. To a large extent, 
Cavalieri has no choice but to work with these concepts. If you excise all metaphysical entities 
from the field of study, only those phenomena that are purely empirical remain.  
Why do I consider moral agent and rationality the only empirical phenomena? When you 
look at a person doing morality (and look only at their behavior) the first thing that stands out is 
the fact that that person makes choices. If you try and deduce – from their behavior and from the 
choices they make – what sort of activity goes on in their heads, the first thing you might 
conclude is that we all share (albeit to varying extents) the capacity to be ‘rational’ (i.e. we can 
think logically). In our capacity to act and make choices, and in our capacity to be rational, all 
humans are the same. If one is determined to establish a theory of morality that is universally 
applicable, your best bet would be to start off with a picture of the individual that includes 
everyone that can do morality. Now we coin a new concept – moral agent – and under that 
concept we include all humans who can make choices and have the capacity for rational thought.  
 The next step is to acknowledge that moral agents often make choices, and often defend 
the choices through their rationality. Rationality could thus be said to relate to choices in the 
sense that it could recommend or discourage choices (give reasons for and against). Since 
rationality is universal to all humans, the reasons it gives are all necessary universalizable. When 
rationality gives us a good reason to act in this way, we say that that action is right (and vice 
versa).  
 Now we can ask: What makes an action right? Answering this question is the job of 
rationality. Rationality must be careful here: in giving a reason for action, it necessarily commits 
itself to recommending that reason to everyone faced with the same situation. Put differently, 
rationality must settle for a criterion for right action (i.e. in virtue of what facts is an action 
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right?) that is satisfactory as a universal moral principle. The fact that Cavalieri selects for her 
right making criteria is, as we’ve seen, the capacity to have interests. Her approach 
far from embodying the traditional, metaphysically oriented notion of intrinsic value, 
achieves both the reweaving of the connection between intrinsic value and subjectivity 
and the development of a radically egalitarian framework. On the one hand, it sees 
intrinsic value only in something as subjective as the satisfaction of the fundamental 
interests – in freedom, in welfare, and in life as a precondition for them – of intentional 
beings. And on the other hand, it grants equal intrinsic value to the satisfaction of these 
interests, as it recognizes that they are equally vital from the subjective perspective of 
their holders. (Cavalieri 2009, 39) 
 
By settling on interests, Cavalieri tries to make a case for why that concept is better than any 
other at capturing the logic of morality, without committing the naturalistic fallacy. The reason 
why the satisfaction of interests is valuable (morally speaking) is because, “from the subjective 
perspective of their holders,” the satisfaction of interests is valuable (factually speaking). I’m 
inclined to think that even by her own logic Cavalieri doesn’t manage to bypass the naturalistic 
fallacy. However, since her logic doesn’t interest me, I won’t pursue that point here. 
Choosing this as the criterion for right action is deemed rational because it coheres and is 
consistent with a lot of judgements we already commonly make (we don’t discriminate on the 
basis of any other biological fact, like race, sex, etc.). Just as we would in the sciences, we can 
test the viability of a hypothesized explanation for the phenomenon of morality by observing 
how well it explains our everyday moral judgements. And, indeed, upon inspection it does seem 
that ‘entities with interests’ and ‘entities which deserve moral consideration’ usually do overlap. 
That is, it appears to be the case that the capacity to have interests is the biological characteristic 
which coincides most frequently with the beings which we designate as worthy of moral 
consideration. Thus, the capacity to have interests is deemed the most rational criterion for a 
moral agent to choose when attempting to justify their actions.  
24 
 
 Since Cavalieri’s criterion for right action is ultimately grounded in an appeal to 
rationality, her argument for animal rights functions by exposing an apparent contradiction in the 
behavior of those who mistreat animals while simultaneously recognizing the rights of other 
sentient beings. The reason we grant moral consideration to blacks, women, and disabled people 
is (or ought to be) because we recognize that they have interests. Animals, since they also have 
interests, should be given the same consideration we give blacks, women, and disabled people. 
Thus, if one grants moral consideration to blacks and not to animals, they are discriminating on 
the basis of something which is morally irrelevant (species membership). We can call this 
speciesism. Speciesism (like racism) is bad because we are being inconsistent in our behavior. It 
does not, in other words, make sense to approve of speciesism and disapprove of racism, since 
doing so would be to adhere to two conflicting and contradictory accounts of morality at the 
same time.  
This single-minded focus on rationality troubles me because it implies that any human 
activity that is not the exercise of rationality is not an activity from which we can derive moral 
knowledge or moral guidance. Cavalieri’s core argument, as we saw, was that we ought to grant 
moral consideration to animal’s interests otherwise we’d be inconsistent and thus irrational. But 
why should an ability to think according to a particular pattern of thought – that of impersonal 
rationality – be the most morally relevant aspect of our personality? Why should that be the most 
inviolable aspect of our identity? Indeed, there other things we do which are much more integral 
to who we are (morally), and which are much more fundamental to the shaping of our moral 
consciousness. Not just rationally consistent beings, we are more importantly beings that fall in 
love, that care for each other, that attend to the needs of others, that attempt to see the realities of 
other individuals in a selfless manner. We are also creative beings: we tell, share and create 
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stories that end up defining us, end up shaping the world around us. What worries me is the 
possibility that this approach, by saying that only rationality is necessary to determine how we 
ought to morally engage with animals, dismisses the moral relevance of other human activities 
(such as attention, contemplation, love, care, etc.).  
 
So far we’ve seen how Cavalieri narrows what could be called the field of study. She 
constrains moral activity to behavior on the one hand, and rationality on the other. She seems to 
hold that our moral nature is a product of the choices we make. In turn, these choices express a 
commitment to an (evaluative) criterion for right action. If we are to justify these choices we 
must formulate an argument which make appeals to facts. These arguments, as we’ve just seen, 
are merely appeals to rationality: they attempt to show why it is more rational to choose this 
criterion as opposed to that criterion. In this picture, then, disagreement is construed as a 
difference in choice, a difference in the evaluative principle which justifies that choice, and as 
something to be resolved through a process of rational deliberation. As I’ve already mentioned, 
this approach troubles me because it sets counter-intuitive limits to what can count as moral 
activity. Indeed, I want to say that moral activity ought to be construed as much more than just 
the ability to make choices and to back those choices up with rational arguments and empirical 
facts. By extension, this approach paints a picture of moral disagreement that is shallow and 
impoverished: we disagree only insofar as we choose differently, insofar as we rationalize our 
choices differently. In the next section I will try to articulate an alternative account of moral 
disagreement which is not as constraining and impoverished as Cavalieri’s.   
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Chapter 2: The Death of the Moth 
In the last chapter I argued for why we need to include more than just acts and choices if 
we’re to get a better picture of how we disagree. If we’re to understand the profundity that 
disagreements often seem to have, an adequate account should, in addition to acts and choices, 
make room for the phenomena of the inner life. It should, in other words, allow thoughts (which 
“do not obviously take the form of choice-guiding arguments”) to play a greater role in 
determining the moral nature of a person, as well as the moral nature of their world (Murdoch 
1998c, 80).  Disagreement, in this light, might begin to seem more fundamental – that is, tied up 
with things like one’s identity, one’s thoughts and styles of thinking, one’s ongoing inner 
monologue, and ultimately with the way one sees things. To acknowledge this is to understand 
disagreements as coming about not just because we choose differently, or because we select as 
important different facts from the same world, but because we inhabit different worlds in the first 
place. Moreover, even what presents itself as a choice, and what factors into how we end up 
choosing, might themselves be predicated on how we see things. As Murdoch notes, “I can only 
choose within the world I can see” (Murdoch 1998b, 329). 
According to this picture, the differences that ultimately underlie moral disagreements are 
often deeply rooted in a person’s inner life. For instance, the meaning behind the words that one 
uses to describe their life and their moral reality contain a depth and dimension that is often 
private – i.e., contextual to the individual language user, and irreducible to a universally agreed 
upon system of meaning. These introspective, cognitive, and linguistic differences between 
individuals manifest themselves in differences in the way we view the world – the way the world 
appears to us. To capture this aspect of moral life, I want to borrow the metaphor of ‘vision’ 
from Iris Murdoch’s essay “Vision and Choice.”  
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Using the metaphor ‘vision’ to explain the crucial differences between people who are 
caught in a moral disagreement has its perks. For one, it already coheres with the way we 
commonly talk and think about disagreement. For instance, it isn’t uncommon to say things like, 
“We won’t ever agree on this issue. We simply see things differently.”  Or, “They seem to 
believe that they were being courageous. But they are still young; someday they’ll come to see 
how that was brash.”  
Another perk to the metaphor of ‘vision’ is that it construes disagreements as actually 
about real things in the world; it implies that we can have a false view of things as well as a true 
one (e.g. someone can be “young” and” brash” and can thus be said to have an immature or 
impoverished vision). Additionally, this metaphor also provides us with a compelling account of 
the process of moral growth. One could be said to engage in moral growth insofar as their vision 
becomes more accurate and more just, insofar as they’re coming to see reality more clearly. 
Thus, if we were to rely on this picture in order to conceptualize the process whereby a person 
(X) comes to see eating meat as wrong, we would say that X, in attending to their reality, came 
to a vision which was more refined, more accurate. In attending to their reality patiently, justly, 
and lovingly, they saw something which made it clear to them that eating meat was wrong. Note 
how the process of coming to a just and accurate vision is construed here as a moral activity. We 
could refer to this activity as one of contemplation, as well as attention to reality (Murdoch 
1998b).  
In contrast, for Cavalieri, “moral differences are essentially differences in choice, given a 
discussable background of [empirical] facts.” Moreover, if we’re to construe these choices as 
moral choices, we must imagine these choices simultaneously expressing a commitment to a 
certain criterion for right action. In this picture, “moral argument will be possible where people 
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have similar criteria… (share descriptive meanings of moral terms) and differ about what exactly 
the facts are” (e.g., if we were to agree that actions are right if they respect the interests of those 
capable of having interests, but we disagree over who has interests) (Murdoch 1998c, 81). If the 
difference between two people is a difference of criteria, one’s only recourse in trying to 
persuade another of the superiority of one’s criteria is to rationally argue for it – that is, to 
demonstrate that one’s criteria has the greatest potential for universalizability, and is thus more 
consistent, and thus better captures the underlying logic of morality (assuming there is a logic). 
For instance, one might say that the capacity to have interests is a better criterion for determining 
right action than ‘intelligence’ since the latter criterion would make permissible discrimination 
against the mentally handicapped.  
Next, I argued that Cavalieri’s (behaviorist) approach to disagreement excluded all but 
the most impoverished and boring concepts from playing a role in moral life (and left us with a 
scientistic picture of our moral reality). I also argued that if we allowed for a more expansive, 
varied, and complex moral vocabulary, we could come to a richer and more accurate account of 
disagreement. This vocabulary should be modeled after the moral language that we commonly 
use in our day-to-day lives: a “moral language which relates to a reality infinitely more complex 
and various than that of science” (Murdoch 1998b, 326). More specifically, when we use moral 
concepts in order to describe our moral landscape, we should allow them to derive their meaning 
in other ways than just according to the scientific model (where one need only group the right 
things under it alongside a straightforward recommendation). Indeed, not all concepts fit that 
model; some, like the concept of a human being (as we’ve seen) are morally loaded, and 
knowing how to use that concept entails a knowledge of what it’s like to live with that concept 
(how it affects the way you think and see; how it affects your ‘vision’). Put differently, we 
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should allow concepts to play a larger role in determining what the relevant facts are and how to 
interpret them. ‘Moral facts’ in this case could be thought of as “moral interpretations of 
situations where the moral concept in question determines what the situation is, and if the 
concept is withdrawn we are not left with the same situation nor the same facts” (Murdoch 
1998c, 95).  
By acknowledging that the facts available to us are often preconditioned by the moral 
concepts we make use of, we’re also able to appreciate the apparent complexity and difficulty 
often involved in addressing and attempting to resolve disagreements. Indeed, “communication 
of a new moral concept cannot necessarily be achieved by specification of factual criteria open to 
any observer… but may involve the communication of a completely new, possibly far-reaching 
and coherent vision… differences are in this sense ‘conceptual’” (82). Picturing disagreements as 
irreducibly and fundamentally conceptual in this way better equips us to articulate the reasons 
behind a person’s inability to see certain aspects of reality – an inability to see them at all, or 
simply in the way you want them to see them. Indeed, we might have different concepts at our 
disposal; or perhaps we have the same concepts but use them differently, according to our 
different experiences and personal histories.  
In using concepts to illuminate our moral universe, we inevitably begin to modify them – 
deepen their meaning – in response to our unique and partly private experiences. In this picture, 
moral concepts can be thought of as tools – initially modeled after a shallow public definition 
(the sort we might learn from a dictionary) – which are gradually refined and tailored to our 
particular needs and circumstances, and in relation to our overall vision. In other words, in the 
process of developing our moral outlook, concepts might begin to take on a meaning which 
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becomes increasingly more private – that is, a meaning more contextual to a person’s individual 
history, and to their particular vision of life (Murdoch 1998b).   
Moreover, what it means to share a concept, in this picture, involves more than just 
telling someone else the rules that go along with that concept, rules which would make it 
perfectly clear, for any rational agent with a full grasp of the facts, how to group the right things 
under it. To acknowledge this is to acknowledge that the concepts we rely on to describe our 
world are “often unavoidably idiosyncratic and inaccessible” (Murdoch 1998b, 326). Indeed, 
description (moral or otherwise) is not “something that can be pulled out of the context of human 
life and interests within which descriptions have their normal place.” Rather, “the capacity to use 
a descriptive term is a capacity to participate in the life from which that word comes.” If we see 
moral concepts in this way, we see them as having “a place in a network of evaluative thought” 
(Diamond 1988, 267). In light of that, sharing a concept might entail trying to show how that 
concept fits into the larger network of concepts that go into configuring one’s own moral vision; 
it might entail showing what life is like with that concept. In turn, persuading someone of the 
value of a concept might entail showing them that there’s something good about life with that 
concept. Certain forms of literature can achieve this.  
Cavalieri, by contrast, considered the idea that non-scientific concepts could determine 
and configure the nature of our moral universe an illicit appeal to metaphysics. For her, it would 
have been impossible to think of moral differences as being in any way conceptual (much less as 
fundamentally and irreducibly so).  
Here I’d like to quickly address a possible concern someone might have with this picture 
of ethics. Given that an individual’s understanding of a situation is wholly determined by the 
concepts they make use of, and given that the concepts they make use of often have a dimension 
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of meaning that is private and particular to that individual, does that mean that objectivity in 
ethics is unattainable? In other words, instead of saying that there’s a way of understanding a 
situation that is more objective than other understandings, should we simply say that the truth of 
every understanding is relative to an individual’s vision? 
I think the fact that we can (and often do) modify, refine, and rearrange our conceptual 
scheme in response to our experiences itself seems to suggest that coming to a more objective 
understanding of our reality is simply a matter of finding the right concepts for a given situation, 
and developing and deepening them in the right ways. To the extent that elaborating, deepening, 
modifying, replacing, and refining a concept leads to greater clarification of a situation, we could 
say that a greater degree of objectivity has been attained. However, there’s a caveat: what counts 
as ‘objectivity’ in matters of morality should be distinguished with what counts as objectivity in 
scientific matters. In ethics, there may be multiple ‘correct’ ways of conceptualizing the same 
situation. Each conceptualization might be ‘true’ for each person and their respective vision of 
life. The sort of objectivity we can strive for in ethics is less totalitarian than the sort of 
objectivity science strives for. A person could have their own personal truth, for instance. That 
truth could be something like that they have a special destiny in store for them. Objectivity here 
can thus be construed as something more contextual and less universal than scientific objectivity. 
To use another example, it is not uncommon to think that, as one ages, one comes to greater 
moral clarity. My sense of what’s right or wrong, my conception of the good life, rests on firmer 
ground than it did ten years ago. We can say, in that case, that my moral vision has become more 
objective.  
None of this, I should note, is to say that morality is totally subjective. There may be 
better and worse ways to conceptualize a given situation. We can determine which 
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conceptualization is better and which is worse by (for instance) comparing them side by side. We 
can ask: What is life like with this set of concepts and how does it differ to a life with that set of 
concepts? In turn, one can judge the respective merit of each conceptual framework by appealing 
to other (perhaps more cherished) concepts. Life is ‘richer’ and more ‘complex’ with this set of 
concepts, one might say. Conceptualizing it this way might ‘cohere’ better with my identity (as 
an ‘American’, say).   
 
So far, I’ve tried to better articulate the sort of phenomena I want to include into what’s 
taken to be the field of study for moral philosophers. More specifically, following Murdoch and 
Diamond, I have said that disagreements can be thought of as arising from conflicting visions of 
life, and as being irreducibly and fundamentally conceptual in nature. I have said that 
disagreements arise not only because we choose differently and/or because our choices express 
commitments to different criteria for what constitutes right action; disagreements also arise 
because our understanding of reality differs – we differ in vision, in the concepts which 
configure the world we see. In what follows I want to (1) illustrate what it might mean for 
someone’s moral understanding of reality (one’s moral vision) to be fundamentally configured 
by one’s concepts. I also want to (2) illustrate the process whereby one undergoes a change of 
vision. As I’ve already suggested, the metaphor of ‘vision’ can help us explain and understand 
the phenomenon of moral growth. For instance, the metaphor of vision allows us to say things 
like our understanding of our moral reality becomes more accurate as a result of a patient and 
loving attention. Thus, what I want to illustrate is how such a process can be carried out.  
In order to illustrate the value of the aforementioned philosophical techniques (the notion 
that our reality is configured by our concepts, that disagreements are fundamentally conceptual 
33 
 
in nature, and that vision can help us understand the phenomenon of moral growth), I rely on a 
very short essay of Virginia Woolf’s, “The Death of the Moth.” We can think of this essay as an 
example of what it might look like to share a vision, as well as the concepts that correspond to it. 
It’s my hope that by understanding the process involved in sharing a vision, we can also come to 
understand what’s at stake in resolving disagreements. Additionally, in understanding the 
process involved in sharing a vision we might also come to a greater appreciation of the 
difficulty and profundity of many forms of disagreement.  
 On its surface “The Death of the Moth” reads as the scattered annotations of a narrator 
(whom I will henceforth simply refer to as “Woolf”), as she provides us with various 
descriptions of a moth as he nears death and ultimately dies. However, more fundamentally, the 
essay chronicles the scarcely perceptible inner movements of a woman as she struggles to arrive 
at a clearer impression of the moth, and, ultimately, at a clearer impression of life and death 
itself. Woolf at points struggles to attend to the being of the moth; only when her attention is 
focused on him – justly and lovingly, as Murdoch would say – does she begin to see him more 
clearly, does she begin to see herself as similarly implicated in the very struggles which beset 
him – the very struggles, indeed, which we hold in common with all of life.  
Woolf starts off with the following passage, directed to the moth she finds in her room:  
Moths that fly by day are not properly to be called moths; they do not excite that pleasant 
sense of dark autumn nights and ivy-blossom which the commonest yellow-underwing 
asleep in the shadow of the curtain never fails to rouse in us. They are hybrid creatures, 
neither gay like butterflies nor somber like their own species. (Woolf 1974, 3) 
 
What interests me here is primarily stylistic. First notice how she starts off with a strong and 
(perhaps) unfair declaration. Notice specifically how it seeks to make distinctions, and impose 
categories – a hierarchy one might say. Woolf draws a line between day moths and night moths, 
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and day moths and butterflies, then declares that day moths are not “properly” moths, since they 
“fly by day.” When I first read that passage I marveled at how much she sounded like a 
philosopher: cold and analytic; coming onto the scene with ready-made distinctions; making 
claims, and trying to rationally back them up. I think it’s fair to say that here in this passage, 
Woolf is not yet attending to what Murdoch might call the “individual reality” of that particular 
moth (Murdoch 1998b, 327). In a sense she cannot, at this point, see beyond the human 
constructs she projects onto the world. 
The moth himself doesn’t make it into the essay until the next sentence: “Nevertheless 
the present specimen, with his narrow hay-colored wings, fringed with a tassel of the same color, 
seemed to be content with life” (Woolf 1974, 3). Here the moth makes his first move, a bold 
resistance to the shallow picture of moth life that Woolf had, for a brief moment, tried to confine 
him in. Note, however, that while she acknowledges that the moth was “content,” she 
nevertheless only goes as far as saying that it “seemed” that way. In other words, she is not yet 
fully clear as to the nature nor the significance of the contentedness, nor of the situation as a 
whole. 
The scene outside her window then catches her attention. “It was a pleasant morning… 
the earth… gleamed with moisture… [and] such vigor came rolling in from the fields... that it 
was difficult to keep the eyes strictly turned upon the book” (3). She describes, in thrall, how the 
rooks too were keeping with their annual festivities; soaring round the tree tops until it 
looked as if a vast net with thousands of black knots in it had been cast up into the air; 
which, after a few moments sank slowly down upon the trees until every twig seemed to 
have a knot at the end of it. Then, suddenly, the net would be thrown into the air again in 
a wider circle this time, with the utmost clamor and vociferation, as though to be thrown 
into the air and settle slowly down upon the tree tops were a tremendously exciting 
experience. (3) 
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What strikes me about this passage is the energy that seems to grip her: the energy which makes 
it difficult to keep “the eyes strictly turned upon the book,” and which materializes itself in the 
texture of her prose: “vigor” comes “rolling” in from the fields, the rooks are “soaring round the 
tree tops,” as if “cast up into the air.” As she follows the movements of the rooks, her description 
undulates, as if held in rapture by the pulsating energy. Her attention is fixed on them, in other 
words, as they are cast up into the air, and as they settle back down, and (once more) as they are 
cast up in the air, and as they settle back down. Here we see a style that is much different than 
that of the previous scene. She allows reality to grip her; she allows it to manifest itself in her 
prose. In the scene we began with, reality was oppressed and obscured by the judgements of the 
narrator: she described what she believed at the expense of what she saw.  
In the next passage, Woolf stumbles upon a first revelation. By simply allowing the world 
to be, and recording only what she saw, she glimpsed a tiny truth: 
The same energy which inspired the rooks, the ploughmen, the horses, and even, it 
seemed, the lean bare-backed downs, sent the moth fluttering from side to side of his 
square of the window-pane. (4) 
 
In turn, she allows the acquisition of this tiny truth to inspire and alter her prose: 
One could not help watching him. One was, indeed, conscious of a queer feeling of pity 
for him. The possibilities of pleasure seemed that morning so enormous and so various 
that to have only a moth’s part in life, and a day moth’s at that, appeared a hard fate, and 
his zest in enjoying his meagre opportunities to the full, pathetic. (4)  
 
I’m interested here in the sudden transition Woolf makes from speaking in the personal “I,” to 
the impersonal “one.” The transition marks a moment of contemplation: Woolf takes a step back 
in order to reflect on the significance of the tiny truth she had earlier witnessed. Additionally, the 
transition to ‘one’ might also be intended as a way of connecting the reader to this tiny truth. In 
other words, Woolf might be attempting to draw us in as participants in order to share with us a 
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pure and unadulterated impression of reality. More specifically, she might be attempting to get us 
to follow her along as she thinks about what she sees, and as her thoughts transform her reality. 
Perhaps her hope is that, in drawing us in as participants to her particular thought processes, we 
might begin to see the world as she does – and maybe then the truth that revealed itself to her 
might begin to reveal itself to us as well. After all, if the moral universe we see is determined by 
the configurations of our thoughts, then coming to share and understand the intricacies and 
nuances of another’s thoughts is, to an extent, to understand and to share their world.  
I also want to draw attention to Woolf’s description of the moth’s life as “pathetic.” It’s 
not clear whether, or to what extent, she means for us to read into that word the sort of negative 
connotations which we commonly give it today (pathetic either as evoking pity, or pathetic as 
evoking pity as well as being lesser, or comically insignificant). Given the time of writing, I 
think the former is more likely. At any rate, what interests me here is the way that ‘pity’ can be 
thought of as functioning as a moral concept (in ‘Murdochian’ sense). We could say that Woolf 
introduced the notion of pity into her essay for its ability to better reflect the moral reality that 
had revealed itself to her. In other words, it is in light of a clearer impression of the individual 
reality of a day moth that it made sense for Woolf to describe him as pathetic. In this essay, 
moral concepts are not just shaping and constructing the world Woolf sees, we also see them 
responding to the demands of an ever more refined impression of her moral reality. To think of 
reality in this way is to think that our understanding of it is infinitely perfectible. It is also to 
think of our concepts as infinitely perfectible. It is to think that concepts will, as a result of an 
attention to reality, become increasingly more complex, more nuanced. It is to think that some 
concepts are better suited than others to describing certain aspects of our reality. It is to think that 
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we can determine what concepts to use and the best ways to use them through experience, 
attention, and contemplation.  
Concepts here appear to us as flexible, living, and organic; not as static and confined to a 
certain pre-determined criterion. If pathetic were only allowed to function according to the 
scientific picture of concepts, it would be unlikely that the moth’s struggles would count as one 
of the things that could be grouped under it. It would be unlikely simply because we have no 
empirical proof that a moth has the psychological capacity to experience the sort of suffering and 
misfortune that is (according to the agreed upon definition) taken as a requisite for someone’s 
experience to be labeled as pathetic. Indeed, for Woolf, it first seems “queer” to describe her 
feelings towards the moth as pity; it had probably never before occurred to her to use it in such a 
circumstance. The meaning of pity can thus be thought of as being itself refined alongside the 
moral reality it seeks to describe.  
Also notice how this process whereby a concept becomes more ‘refined’ (or elaborated 
upon, or broadened) is achieved. To start, Woolf does not limit herself to the public use of pity – 
a criterion which might hold that pity is a feeling of sorrow in response to the suffering or 
misfortune of another. Nor does she appeal to scientific research in order to prove that the moth’s 
experiences – described in neutral and scientific language – do in fact merit classification as 
instances of ‘suffering’ or ‘misfortune’. Nor does she try and make an argument for why, given 
the scientific research on moths and the way pity is commonly used, all rational agents ought to 
feel pity for moths in this or that situation. Rather, for Woolf, pity acquires its meaning in a more 
discursive process, in reference to her own particular experiences and to what we could call her 
‘inner monologue’ or her ‘stream of consciousness’. Pity could thus be said to acquire a meaning 
(in response to her particular thought processes, and to her particular experiences as their 
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understood according her particular way of seeing) that diverges from the way pity is commonly 
used. More specifically, we see Woolf justify her (divergent) use of pity by elaborating on the 
situation, contextualizing that pity in relation to the particulars of that situation, and ultimately by 
embedding it within a larger web of concepts. The moth endured a “hard fate” in light of “the 
possibilities of pleasure” that seemed “enormous and various,” and yet he displayed “zest” in 
enjoying his “meager opportunities”: that is what Woolf means when she says she feels pity for 
him.  
In turn, what Woolf means by a hard fate, zest, meager opportunities, the possibilities of 
pleasure, etc. is also not obvious, nor something we can immediately discern by appealing to the 
public uses of these words. If anything, to understand what she means when she uses these 
concepts, one must go back to the description of the rooks outside, and the ‘vigor’ rolling in from 
the fields (it is partly in contrast to her description of those events that these concepts derive their 
meaning). One might also want to look back at the initial description of the moth as a ‘hybrid 
creature’ (i.e., his opportunities were meager partly because he was a day moth, and thus he 
endured a hard fate).  
The point I want to make is (to reiterate) that “description itself [cannot be] thought of as 
something that can be pulled out of the context of human life and interests within which 
descriptions have their normal place… the capacity to use a descriptive term is a capacity to 
participate in the life from which that word comes” (Diamond 1988, 267). Thus, to understand 
Woolf’s descriptions we must, essentially, attempt to participate in her life, and in her thoughts 
and observations.  
Here we might begin to better understand why disagreements are often so difficult to 
overcome. For one, disagreements might be more far-reaching than they initially seem. If two 
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people disagree about, say, the value of animal life, one might be inclined to think that the 
difference between them is simply a difference in how they think about animals. However, if one 
is try to discern why each person think about animals in the way they do, one might begin to 
realize that the difference in much more fundamental: it might be involve things like how one 
thinks about themselves, what they fear, what they love, what they find praiseworthy, etc.  
Despite the progress Woolf has made in her attempt to view the moth more accurately – 
to attend lovingly and justly to his individual reality – we can still detect a bit of self-
centeredness in her ‘view’ of him. Her pity partly stems from a belief that to have “only a moth’s 
part in life” is something inherently tragic. While a significant effort has been made to 
imaginatively inhabit the world of the moth, Woolf still keeps a firm grip on the distinctions she 
started off with at the beginning of the piece. The moth is classified as a day moth, which, for 
Woolf, are “hybrid creatures” (Wolf 1974, 3). Here she comes to understand, and look down 
upon, his existence according to and because of a classification: the fate of being overlooked by 
the categories and distinctions humans rely on to appropriate the world is somehow taken to be a 
shortcoming on his part, as a sort of fault. However, in the very next section we begin to see a 
move away from that sort of thinking/seeing (more specifically, seeing as a form of thinking).  
He flew vigorously to one corner of his compartment, and, after waiting there a second, 
flew across to the other. What remained for him but to fly to a third corner and then to a 
fourth? That was all he could do, in spite of the size of the downs, the width of the sky, 
the far-off smoke of houses, and the romantic voice, now and then, of a steamer out at 
sea. What he could do, he did. (4) 
 
I’m interested in this passage to the extent that it could allow us to say that in it, Woolf, as a 
result of a loving attention, began to see her earlier prejudice – the aspect of her pity which arose 
merely from a belief in the insignificance of moths, and day moths in particular – as unfair, or 
unjust. It would not be fair to think of him in that way, I see her saying, because nothing else 
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“remained for him” to do, and because, indeed, “that was all he could do” (emphasis mine). Then 
she repeats, “What he could do, he did” – a short, slow sentence, punctuated with hard “d’s,” 
which seem to urge the reader to slow down with her (4). Hold still, it seems to say, there’s 
something here to see. Sure enough, this patient attention then leads her to an even greater truth 
in the next passage.  
Watching him, it seemed as if a fiber, very thin but pure, of the enormous energy of the 
world had been thrust into his frail and diminutive body. As often as he crossed the pane, 
I could fancy that a thread of vital light became visible. He was little or nothing but life. 
(4) 
 
This passage is perhaps the most significant of the piece. In it, we see an echo to an earlier 
passage, where the moth is seen “fluttering from side to side of his square of the window-pane,” 
“inspired” by “the same energy which inspired” the scene outside. In that passage, I had said that 
Woolf, by attending to the world, and specifically to the individual reality of that particular moth, 
came to acquire a tiny truth. Here we see Woolf plunge even deeper into that reality, and coming 
to grasp an even bigger truth: the moth, rather than appearing to her only as “inspired” by the 
same “energy” that lay outside her window, now appears to her as a manifestation of life itself, as 
literally embodying the energy of the world (3). In her words,  
It was as if someone had taken a tiny bead of pure life and decking it as lightly as 
possible with down and feathers, had set it dancing and zigzagging to show us the true 
nature of life. (4) 
 
In light of this sudden transformation, this clearer perception of reality, Woolf once again steps 
back to analyze what had transpired:  
Yet, because he was so small, and so simple a form of the energy that was rolling in at 
the open window and driving its way through so many narrow and intricate corridors in 
my own brain and in those of other human beings, there was something marvelous as 
well as pathetic about him. (4) 
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First notice how this change in what she sees in turn affects what moral concepts she decides to 
use. Instead of appearing simply as “pathetic,” he is now “marvelous as well as pathetic” 
(emphasis mine). It’s significant that Woolf only begins to describe the moth as marvelous when 
he reveals himself to her as being “little or nothing but life” – and not just any ‘life’, but the very 
same life that was “driving its way through so many narrow and intricate corridors in my own 
brain.” In attending to the moth’s individual reality, Woolf came to see a fundamental sameness 
between her reality and the moth’s. Before, the moth had appeared to Woolf only as a “hybrid 
creature,” whom she referred to as “the present specimen” (3). And while she identified with him 
enough to feel pity, this pity perplexed her. Now, we see the differences that had once separated 
them become overshadowed by the discovery of something which unites them: a truth which 
allowed her to understand him better. She understands him in the sense that (and insofar as) she 
understands what it’s like to be alive. Ultimately, it is in reference to that similarity, and that 
deeper understanding of him, that she can sensibly say that he was “marvelous.”  
However, note how Woolf still refers to the moth as being “so simple a form of the 
energy” found outside and in her herself (4; emphasis mine). And later, “the thought of all that 
life might have been had he been born in any other shape caused one to view his simple activities 
with a kind of pity” (5). The moth, despite being “little or nothing but life,” still, when 
considered in relation to the other forms that life can take, appears as small and simple, and 
maybe even of lesser significance (4). I want to say that even here, the process in which Woolf 
seems involved – of coming to a more accurate and just view of the moth – is still unfinished. 
We see the last stage of the process in the following passage, where she witnesses him in the 
throes of death.  
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I forgot about him. Then, looking up, my eye was caught by him. He was trying to 
resume his dancing, but seemed either so stiff or so awkward that he could only flutter to 
the bottom of the window-pane; and when he tried to fly across it he failed. Being intent 
on other matters I watched these futile attempts for a time without thinking, 
unconsciously waiting for him to resume his flight, as one waits for a machine, that has 
stopped momentarily, to start again without considering the reason of its failure. After 
perhaps a seventh attempt he slipped from the wooden ledge and fell, fluttering his wings, 
on to his back on the window sill. The helplessness of his attitude roused me. It flashed 
upon me that he was in difficulties; he could no longer raise himself; his legs struggled 
vainly. But, as I stretched out a pencil, meaning to help him to right himself, it came over 
me that the failure and awkwardness were the approach of death. (5) 
 
What most intrigues me about this passage is the insistent use of the passive voice: “my eye was 
caught by him,” “roused me,” “it flashed upon me,” “it came over me.” The authority of the 
narrator is subsumed by that of the moth’s: she is not assuming these things, she is being told of 
them. It’s as if the reality of this moth’s very being takes a hold of Woolf as well as her prose.  
Additionally, we see a tension here between the moth’s individual reality and Woolf’s 
momentary state of inattention. Woolf describes herself as “being intent on other matters,” and 
watching “without thinking;” she even describes herself as “unconscious.” I don’t think it’s a 
coincidence that during this period of inattention, Woolf waits for the moth “as one waits for a 
machine” – a description which seems to imply that, in her eyes at least, he has ceased to be a 
being with subjectivity and individuality. What interests me here is the connection that is implied 
between inattentiveness and being blind to the reality of another individual. This is a topic on 
which Murdoch has a lot to say. Specifically, Murdoch thought that there was a very particular 
type of attention that was capable of revealing the individual reality of another: a loving 
attention. She thought that what blinded us (in the first place) to the reality of another are the 
attachments and fantasies propagated by the ego. In turn, only a loving gaze directed at an 
individual’s reality could break us free from those attachments and fantasies. Love and reality 
are intimately connected for Murdoch: to attend to someone lovingly is to see them as they really 
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are (that is, selflessly). Love and the ego are thus construed as opposites: to love is to be selfless, 
to attend to someone without projecting self-serving fantasies onto them, and to attend to them 
disinterestedly (Murdoch 1998b).  
Also worth noting is how Woolf attempts to help the moth “right himself” with her 
pencil. It’s possible that Woolf meant that phrase to do more than just the obvious: perhaps it 
isn’t a coincidence that “right” sounds exactly like ‘write’, or that right could be interpreted 
according to its other meaning – right as in righting a wrong. Indeed, it could be said that in 
writing about the life of the moth, she’s “stretching out her pencil” (Wolf 1974, 5) to help him in 
a less literal yet much more significant way: that is, by helping him write himself, and thus right 
himself against “an oncoming doom” (6). Writing, for Woolf, might be a means of capturing an 
impression of reality, and more specifically of another’s reality, in a way that is right, in a way 
that does that reality justice. 
For Woolf, a just account of the moth’s reality ends up taking the following form: 
Somehow it [death] was opposed to the little hay-colored moth. It was useless to try to do 
anything. One could only watch the extraordinary efforts made by those tiny legs against 
an oncoming doom which could, had it chosen, have submerged an entire city, not merely 
a city, but masses of human beings; nothing, I knew, had any chance against death. 
Nevertheless after a pause of exhaustion the legs fluttered again. It was superb this last 
protest, and so frantic that he succeeded at last in righting himself. One’s sympathies, of 
course, were all on the side of life. Also, when there was nobody to care or to know, this 
gigantic effort on the part of an insignificant little moth, against a power of such 
magnitude, to retain what no one else valued or desired to keep, moved one strangely. 
Again, somehow, one saw life, a pure bead. I lifted the pencil again, useless though I 
knew it to be. But even as I did so, the unmistakable tokens of death showed themselves. 
The body relaxed, and instantly grew stiff. The struggle was over. The insignificant little 
creature now knew death. As I looked at the dead moth, this minute wayside triumph of 
so great a force over so mean an antagonist filled me with wonder. Just as life had been 
strange a few minutes before, so death was now as strange. The moth having righted 
himself now lay most decently and uncomplainingly composed. O yes, he seemed to say, 
death is stronger than I am. (6) 
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What’s most significant about this is that the moth’s life is now being viewed for the first time, 
not in relation to other forms that life can take (and thus as being comparatively simple and 
pathetic), but in relation to death itself. In framing his existence in these terms, Woolf succeeds, 
at last, in capturing the significance of his individual reality. The tension between life and death, 
and more specifically, the “extraordinary efforts” which all life-forms display in their struggle 
against death: this is something both universal, yet deeply personal; something which we all hold 
in common, yet experience alone. In his “gigantic effort” to stave off death, the moth is no 
different than any other life form that seeks to survive; yet, at the same time, his struggle is 
unlike any other, since no one else can experience it in the same way. Indeed, for the moth, 
nothing matters more than this struggle. His whole being is at stake; he fights off death with 
everything he has.   
In order to allow the moth to reveal himself to her in this way, on his terms, free from 
bias and prejudice, Woolf had to remove herself, in a sense, from the picture – a process which 
Murdoch refers to as “unselfing” (Murdoch 1998a, 369). Here we see the final stage of what I 
had earlier referred to as a patient and loving attention to an individual reality. Before, Woolf 
took in what she saw according to her terms, at the expense of his: for instance, in referring to 
him as a “day moth,” she denied his individuality at the expense of a pseudo-scientific 
classification; day moths, she implies, are pathetic since they do not “fly by day” (Woolf 1974, 
3). In contrast, she now records his life without ever measuring him up against any external 
standards; she does not, in other words, determine his significance by comparing him or his 
experiences to anything or anyone other. Instead, she takes his individual reality at face value, 
assigns it the significance that he himself might assign it: The moth’s “legs fluttered” in a 
“gigantic” and “extraordinary” effort to resist an “oncoming doom.” He was up against a force 
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“which could have submerged an entire city, not merely a city, but masses of human beings.” 
And even though it was “useless,” and even though his individual life was one which “no one 
else valued or desired to keep,” he nevertheless ‘protested frantically’ on its behalf. Seeing this 
“moved one strangely,” and “filled me with wonder.” It is “superb,” she says (6). In shifting the 
weight of her attention from her own thoughts and experiences to those of the moth, Woolf can 
be said to become the narrator for his life. With this in mind, we could also give an additional 
dimension of meaning to the transition she makes between writing from the personal ‘I’ to the 
impersonal ‘one’ – perhaps she means to deemphasize her own subjectivity in order to come at a 
clearer sense of the moth’s. Perhaps we could also say that, in these moments, Woolf opens 
herself up to the world and allows some truth, unadulterated by what Murdoch called ‘the 
fantasies of the ego’, to freely impress itself on her.  
Woolf actually writes about this ability to receive an immediate impression of reality, and 
says of it that, indeed, “the shock-receiving capacity is what makes me a writer” (Woolf 1985, 
72). She describes these moments as such that “I am hardly aware of myself, but only of the 
sensation. I am only the container of the feeling of ecstasy, of the feeling of rapture” (67). On 
these rare occasions – these “moments of being” (70), as she calls them – “a token of some real 
thing behind appearances” is revealed to one (72). To better understand this idea of a “moment 
of being,” we can contrast it to what Woolf calls “moments of non-being,” in which reality 
seems to us “embedded” in a “kind of nondescript cotton wool.” To live in a state of ‘non-being’ 
is to not live “consciously,” it is to let life rush past you. She associates “non-being” with the sort 
of mundane, humdrum experiences of everyday life that seem to quietly wash away with the 
passage of time (70). However, Woolf nevertheless feels “that behind the cotton wool is hidden a 
pattern; that we… are connected with this; that the whole world is a work of art; that we are part 
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of the work of art.” This “pattern,” in turn, is what one is exposed to in a ‘moment of being’. 
Moreover, the task of the writer, as Woolf conceives it, is to “make it [this pattern] real by 
putting it into words. It is only by putting into words that I can make it whole” (72). 
 
 I’d also like to explore how ‘life’ and ‘death’, for Woolf, function as moral concepts. 
Note how she relies on these concepts to reframe her understanding of the moth: it is because of 
how these concepts configured her understanding of his individual reality that she was able to see 
him justly, and accurately. However, these concepts, throughout her essay, underwent a radical 
transformation. She goes from thinking of life and death as being “opposed to each other” 
(which, indeed, accords with what we could call their ‘public use’) to an understanding of them 
where the relationship between them is much more complicated. Specifically, we see a tension in 
how she describes life and death, and the process of dying, and how she says of all of it “just as 
life had been strange a few minutes before, so death was now as strange.” The tension is this: 
despite that fact that she conceives of death as opposed to the moth, and the struggle between 
them as between “so great a force over so mean an antagonist,” she nevertheless imagines him, 
after the moment of dying, as “most decently and uncomplainingly composed.” Indeed, we see 
this decency and composition once again in the next (and last) sentence: “O yes, he seemed to 
say, death is stronger than I am.” Certainly Woolf meant these words not as a note of resignation 
on the moth’s part, but as a testament perhaps to the dignity with which he carried himself – the 
dignity, indeed, that we see in all of life, even when it stands in tension with the forces of death. 
(This dignity is the very thing which allows him to right himself in the end). She imagines him, 
ultimately, at peace. However, that such peace could come about as a result of such a “frantic” 
struggle is perhaps what makes her say that “death was… strange.” Perhaps for Woolf, life and 
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death, seen in this new light, don’t seem as “opposed” to each other as they once were, and as 
they’re usually understood to be. I see her saying: Even when life is overcome by the forces of 
death in a “frantic” struggle, there can still be peace; and even the tension in which life and death 
seem perpetually locked, can, in a certain light, appear to us as “moving” and “wonderful,” and 
maybe even as dignifying (Wolf 1974, 6). 
This fundamental truth about the nature of life and death is one which, as I already 
mentioned, stands at odds with the ways these phenomena are traditionally understood. Death is 
defined as the absence of life, and vice versa. According to this logic, then, life and death are 
opposites, and thus they do in fact oppose each other. Woolf however came to see through this 
simple dichotomy, and did so through patient attention to reality. And while the observations of 
this reality which she relays to us may not always cohere with a rational and scientific 
presupposition of what the world ought to look like (and the sort of things we can justifiably 
claim as experience and knowledge) it is faithful to an immediate impression of reality (or a 
‘primary apprehension’, as Murdoch would call it). And, for an artist at least, that faithfulness to 
reality is the most important thing.   
 
 In these last few pages I have tried to give an account of the process in which one can 
come to a more accurate and just understanding of reality. In order to illustrate the nature of this 
process, I have relied on the concepts of ‘vision’, ‘attention’, ‘love’, ‘moments of being’, and the 
idea that one’s reality is conceptually configured. I have argued that these concepts are not just 
valuable to understanding the phenomenon of moral growth, but also that of moral disagreement. 
Additionally, I’ve argued that the approach that I’ve advanced has several advantages over an 
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approach like Cavalieri’s in explaining the phenomenon of moral disagreement. Here I’d like to 
summarize what some of those advantages are.  
First, in making room for the phenomena of the inner life, this approach gives us a much 
richer account of what’s actually at stake in moral disagreements. In other words, it gives us a 
better picture of how people actually disagree. Instead of construing disagreement as a difference 
in the criteria by which we choose to justify our actions according to, I’ve argued that the 
differences go much deeper and encompass things like our inner monologue, our style of 
thought, our manner of speaking, the things we find praiseworthy – in short, nothing less than 
our total vision of life. 
Second, I’ve argued that in order to understand what our disagreements are actually 
about, we need a more expansive, more diverse, and richer moral vocabulary – a vocabulary 
moreover that doesn’t limit itself to a strict scientific model. In other words, I’ve argued that we 
need to move beyond arguments over simple concepts like right, and acknowledge that many (if 
not all) of the concepts we routinely rely on to understand our reality have a moral dimension to 
them. For instance, concepts like animal, and human being are themselves morally loaded (i.e., 
to understand them is to understand what it’s like to live with those concepts, is to understand 
how those concepts might affect our moral universe). Indeed, concepts such as those likely play 
a larger role in determining our attitudes towards animals than concepts like right action. Even 
concepts like pity, life, and death are (as we saw with Woolf) capable of influencing and playing 
a role in shaping our attitudes towards animals. Ultimately, we must acknowledge that moral 
disagreements arise because we differ in the innumerable concepts that we live our life by.  
Third, in contrast to Cavalieri’s approach (which holds that rational argument or an 
appeal to scientific research are the only two means of resolving disputes), I’ve suggested that 
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the capacity to change, morally, first requires a change in one’s concepts. In other words, I’ve 
suggested that moral change can only occur through a process of modifying, refining, 
reorganizing, elaborating, and deepening the concepts which configure one’s moral reality in the 
first place. In turn, I’ve argued that this process whereby one’s concepts change can be attained 
not just through rational deliberation, but also (and more importantly) through a loving attention 
to reality.  
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